Service segment competition: size or value, which matters?

Weixiang Huang, Wenhui Zhou, Pengfei Guo and Han Zhu

International Journal of Production Research, 2021, vol. 59, issue 4, 1281-1299

Abstract: We study a service market with two firms: one that provides regular and another that provides premium services. Customers are delay sensitive and heterogeneous in evaluating the service level. We study two competition games that differ in segmentation-marketing strategies. One is the size-based competition in which firms compete on the segment size dimension, and the other is the value-based competition in which firms compete on the segment target (regarding customer valuation) dimension. For both games, the Nash equilibrium always exists, and the (Pareto dominant) equilibrium is unique. Interestingly, the premium service provider's effective arrival rate can be increasing in its competitor's service rate in the value-based game. Moreover, we capture the conditions for the equilibrium market as either a monopoly or a duopoly and show that size-based competition helps sustain service variety. We also show that the prices are reduced in the value-based game; the premium (regular) service provider serves more (fewer) customers in the value-based game than in the size-based game. Our results show that value-based competition is more intensive in the sense that the number of customers who are served, customer surplus and social welfare are higher, while the total revenue of two firms is lower in the value-based competition than in the size-based competition.

Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00207543.2020.1722328 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:tprsxx:v:59:y:2021:i:4:p:1281-1299

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/TPRS20

DOI: 10.1080/00207543.2020.1722328

Access Statistics for this article

International Journal of Production Research is currently edited by Professor A. Dolgui

More articles in International Journal of Production Research from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().