Risk-Sharing in Seaport Terminal Concessions

Carlos Cruz () and Rc Marques ()

Transport Reviews, 2012, vol. 32, issue 4, 455-471

Abstract: Over the last two decades, infrastructure development has often been supported by public--private partnerships, particularly under concession arrangements. This paper addresses terminal concession contracts in the seaport sector, and especially the problem of risk-sharing. An effective allocation of risks is the base for the well functioning of the market, and for the success of the ‘landlord’ model. Under this model, the relationship between concessionaires and port authorities is fully dependent on a contract that should be in force for the period of the concession (20, 30 or more years). Based on several Portuguese concession contracts, this paper addresses the issue of risk-sharing agreements. Some policy implications are drawn, namely, alternative contract arrangements to decrease opportunistic behaviour by concessionaires, and to provide incentives to improve efficiency.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/01441647.2012.664576

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