Genetic Testing, Insurance Economics, and Societal Responsibility

Patrick Brockett, Richard MacMinn and Maureen Carter

North American Actuarial Journal, 1999, vol. 3, issue 1, 1-20

Abstract: Three major perspectives emerge when the discussion of the implications of genetic testing on the insurance industry commences. One viewpoint, strongly advocated by certain consumer groups and ethicists on the basis of societal responsibility, categorically denies any necessity for connecting the results of genetic testing and issuance of insurance. By contrast, the insurance industry, upon examining the economics and dynamics of participation in voluntary insurance markets, lives in fear of a world filled with asymmetrical information (counter to the axioms for competitive markets), adverse selection (action by the insured as a result of asymmetric information to the perceived economic disadvantage of the insurer), and ultimately even the possibility of potential market failure or insurance company insolvency. An actuarial perspective considering the benefits (to the insurer) of this new genetic information concentrates primarily on the possibility of developing improved quantitative assessments of risk and better calculations of the actuarial present value of future loss costs based on the new statistically significant information gained from genetic testing. The strengths and weaknesses and facts and fallacies of each of these perspectives are examined in this paper, and potential solutions to the ultimate role of genetic testing in insurance underwriting and rate making are considered from the perspectives of the major players in this debate.

Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1080/10920277.1999.10595764

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