A Derivative Alternative as Executive Compensation

Don M. Chance

Financial Analysts Journal, 1997, vol. 53, issue 2, 6-8

Abstract: Forward contracts are superior to options as executive compensation. Forward contracts require the executive to purchase the stock, have no value when issued, and are easily valued during their lives. They provide the same incentives as stock but without the right to vote, which limits the executive's influence over the board.

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.2469/faj.v53.n2.2065 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ufajxx:v:53:y:1997:i:2:p:6-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/ufaj20

DOI: 10.2469/faj.v53.n2.2065

Access Statistics for this article

Financial Analysts Journal is currently edited by Maryann Dupes

More articles in Financial Analysts Journal from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().