Reclaiming Shareholder Power

Victor F. Morris

Financial Analysts Journal, 1997, vol. 53, issue 3, 7-10

Abstract: A new approach to empowering shareholders relies on control of the corporate purse strings rather than the proxy ballot. Corporations would be taxed on the conduit principle; that is, they would pay no taxes providing they distributed all of their earnings to shareholders, who after paying taxes on them, could reinvest them wherever they chose.

Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.2469/faj.v53.n3.2080

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