Shareholder Activism in Small-Cap Newly Public Firms

Emmanuel R. Pezier and Paolo F. Volpin

Financial Analysts Journal, 2024, vol. 80, issue 2, 52-73

Abstract: We examine a private dataset of engagements by a UK fund in small-cap newly public firms. The fund inherits unwanted holdings from disparate investors and earns fees liquidating its portfolio. It considers activism only when blocks cannot be exited efficiently. Engagements are with firms that have founder chairpersons or CEOs, other blockholders thought to be supportive, and few outside directors. Engagements are conducted behind-the-scenes, without involving other shareholders, are strikingly successful, and result in cumulative abnormal returns of 8% to 10% when objectives are met. The fund outperforms benchmarks, and we estimate that abnormal returns derive mostly from engagements rather than stock picking.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/0015198X.2023.2283445

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