Development Traps and Escaping Development Traps: What Can We Learn from Freedom of Information Laws?

Aaron Erlich

The International Trade Journal, 2016, vol. 30, issue 5, 378-382

Abstract: In this talk, I discuss my previous research on the relationship between political competition and the passage of Freedom of Information (FOI) laws. In this previous work, using data on Mexican states, I find that political competition is an important determinant of the speed of passage of FOI laws. I then discuss a larger research project that examines all FOI requests made to the Mexican national government and investigate descriptive statistics related to ProMéxico, Mexico’s trade promotion agency. I conclude by arguing that FOI laws should be employed more frequently in the study of international trade.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/08853908.2016.1211571

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