Economic Rationale for National Treatment in Intellectual Property Protection When Countries Have Different Innovation Technologies

Yasukazu Ichino

The International Trade Journal, 2020, vol. 34, issue 4, 367-386

Abstract: National treatment (NT), a practice of governments granting the same patent protection to all inventors regardless of their national origin, is a main feature of international agreements on intellectual property rights (IPRs). In this study, we examine the economic rationale for NT in international IPR agreements. By comparing the equilibrium of a noncooperative patent policy game under a non-NT regime and that under an NT regime, we find that NT in IPR protection reduces global welfare when countries have different innovation-generating technologies. We suggest that a role of NT may be to enhance fairness among countries.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/08853908.2020.1734118

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