American War Powers and Terrorists: The Case of Usama Bin Laden

Ryan C. Hendrickson

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2000, vol. 23, issue 3, 161-174

Abstract: During the Cold War, observers of American politics noted that an imperial presidency developed in regards to the decision to use force abroad. Although the Constitution and the War Powers Act of 1973 grant significant war powers to the Congress, Congress largely deferred and abdicated these powers to the commander in chief, as the President asserted essential unlimited constitutional authority. This practice held true when the United States used force against terrorist actors, such as President Ronald Reagans strikes against Muammar Qaddafi. However, President Clintons strikes against Usama Bin Laden represent a different example of the war powers interplay. Domestic political considerations for Clinton and the nature of the United States target presented new incentives and an unprecedented case of much closer consultation with Congress prior to using force.

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1080/105761000412751

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