EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Aum Shinrikyo's Biological Weapons Program: Why Did it Fail?

William Rosenau

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2001, vol. 24, issue 4, 289-301

Abstract: During the six years since the Aum Shinrikyo cult's nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway system, the United States has undertaken a major effort to prevent and respond to terrorist acts involving nuclear, radiological, biological and chemical weapons. Given this high level of official activity, it is remarkable that Aum's protracted and costly, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempts to acquire and use mass-casualty biological agents has received scant analytical attention. Specifically, there has been relatively little focus on one critical question: Why did this apparently sophisticated and lavishly funded program ultimately fail? Aum's failure suggests that it may, in fact, be far more difficult to carry out a deadly bioterrorism attack than has sometimes been portrayed by government officials and the press. Despite its significant financial resources, dedicated personnel, motivation, and freedom from the scrutiny of the Japanese authorities, Aum was unable to achieve its objectives. The Aum case illustrates how acquiring virulent strains of biological agents can be a major hurdle for prospective bioterrorists. Cult-like terrorist organizations, the ones that appear to have the greatest interest in mass-casualty biological weapons, may be least suited to meet the complex demands associated with a bioweapon program. As the Aum example illustrates, a paranoid, fantasy-prone and sometimes violent atmosphere is not conducive to the sound scientific judgement needed to produce mass-casualty biological weapons.

Date: 2001
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/10576100120887 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:uterxx:v:24:y:2001:i:4:p:289-301

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/uter20

DOI: 10.1080/10576100120887

Access Statistics for this article

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism is currently edited by Bruce Hoffman

More articles in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().

 
Page updated 2025-04-03
Handle: RePEc:taf:uterxx:v:24:y:2001:i:4:p:289-301