Sectarian Violence and Social Group Identity in Pakistan

Isaac Kfir

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2014, vol. 37, issue 6, 457-472

Abstract: Individual basic security is limited in Pakistan as the state is institutionally weak. One way to attain basic security is by joining groups who provide security and services. Consequently, groups not part of the political mainstream, to attract a following, must therefore show that they are sufficiently powerful to obtain concessions from established actors. Thus, by engaging in violence primarily of a sectarian nature, the Pakistani Taliban sustains itself as a unified force while also highlighting that it is a powerful group, which in turn it hopes would enable it to curve a political space and win concessions from the established elite. Using social group identity theory, club goods, and the economics of extremism, the article highlights why the Pakistani Taliban has increasingly attacked minorities and why more must be done to address sectarian violence.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2014.903374

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