Microdisarmament and Compliance Costs: An Analysis of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs

Tatjana Stankovic

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2015, vol. 38, issue 9, 691-709

Abstract: Focusing on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs, this article considers why some armed groups disarm and demobilize, while others refuse to do so. Previous research focused on intergroup rivalries and identified enforcement as a critical barrier. This study considers the effect of (1) war benefits and (2) intragroup dynamics and argues that distribution problems obstruct conflict resolution. Using a simple game-theoretic model, the article demonstrates that optimal programs (1) consider that combatants' cost of supporting peace varies and (2) require a mix of positive and negative incentives to motivate all ex-combatants to participate and comply with program requirements.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2015.1049052

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