Escalation, Emulation, and the Failure of Hybrid Warfare in Afghanistan

Jan Angstrom

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2017, vol. 40, issue 10, 838-856

Abstract: In this article, I argue that hybridization is a contingent result of the dynamics of some conflicts but not others. In particular, faced with opponents with great power, weaker powers seek a situation of asymmetry to gain victory. Drawing on within-case analysis of the conduct of war during the past thirty years in Afghanistan, I demonstrate that what we now consider to be “hybrid” represents an important continuity and strategic option in Afghan warfare. Still, the analysis also demonstrates that choosing “hybrid” has not been a strategy that has worked. Hezb-i-Islami's rather limited attempt for conventionalization of the war against the forces of Dostum and Massoud in 1992 failed and the Taliban's more far-reaching attempt for conventionalization has so far also failed to reap strategic success. This suggests that the threat of hybrid war is inflated.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1248665

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