The Logic of Constitutional Engineering: Institutional Design and Counterterrorism from Aristotle to Arend Lijphart

Matt Qvortrup

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2018, vol. 41, issue 2, 96-108

Abstract: Originally conceived by Aristotle and Thomas Hobbes, comparative constitutional engineering in its modern form is a relatively new field of political science. It is based on the premise that political behavior and policy outcomes can be affected and shaped by institutional design such as, above all, electoral systems. The article provides an overview of the empirical literature underlying this branch of institutional counterterrorism. The article presents the logic of constitutional engineering from its classical origins and especially through the work of Arend Lijphart. It is suggested that Lijphart provides a new paradigm in the sense employed by Thomas Kuhn. The article provides original research in support of this showing that the presence of consensus institutions has better explanatory value than most social factors.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/1057610X.2016.1249779 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:uterxx:v:41:y:2018:i:2:p:96-108

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/uter20

DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2016.1249779

Access Statistics for this article

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism is currently edited by Bruce Hoffman

More articles in Studies in Conflict and Terrorism from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().