Sinai's Insurgency: Implications of Enhanced Guerilla Warfare

Omar Ashour

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2019, vol. 42, issue 6, 541-558

Abstract: This article aims to explain the endurance of Sinai's insurgency despite its limited military capacity and resources, and the overwhelming man- and fire-power of the incumbent's regular and tribal forces. After reviewing the literature on how insurgents beat or survive strong incumbents, the article offers a short overview of historical developments and socio-political causes leading to the rise of Sinai Province and its military build-up. It then analyses, qualitatively and quantitatively, how Sinai Province fight, based on its original documents and releases as well as on interviews with individuals who fought against it. Finally, the article concludes with an explanation of why did the insurgency survive and, at times, expanded based on the quality of its military tactics. It also provides policy implications, as a result.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2017.1394653

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