Government Mass Killing and Post-Conflict Domestic Trials

Nam Kyu Kim and Gary Uzonyi

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2020, vol. 43, issue 5, 396-413

Abstract: Why do some countries implement trials to punish perpetrators of state-sponsored mass killing during civil war? A common explanation is that domestic and international demand for justice pressures the government to implement trials. However, this demand is unlikely to produce prosecutions because state-sponsored violence during fighting provides elites incentive to conceal information after war. The revelation of information concerning the government's atrocities could result in renewed domestic instability or international sanction. Therefore, a government that has committed atrocities during the civil war, and emerges victorious from the conflict, should be unlikely to pursue trials in the aftermath of the war.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1469587

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