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Testing Deterrence by Denial: Experimental Results from Criminology

Janice Gross Stein and Ron Levi

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2023, vol. 46, issue 1, 101-121

Abstract: Deterrence by denial is gaining attention as a counter-terrorism strategy. Yet there are formidable obstacles to testing its empirical validity. We argue that experimental and quasi-experimental evidence from criminology offers support for deterrence by denial strategies. Studies of individual offending, gangs, and mafias suggest that deterrence by denial would not displace terrorist activity elsewhere. We also find evidence that physical target hardening and enhanced human guardianship can deter terrorism, with public surveillance being less effective. Criminological evidence thus supports that deterrence by denial works by increasing the risk of failure. We argue for further rapprochement between terrorism and related research fields.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2020.1777710

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