Strategies of Armed Group Consolidation in the Afghan Civil War (1989–2001)

Megan Erickson and Michael Gabbay

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2024, vol. 47, issue 9, 984-1005

Abstract: What explains the variation in the strategies of consolidation among armed groups? We examine three conditions that can explain the modes of militant consolidation – territorial control, organizational structure, and external support. We test these theoretical conjectures using unique time series data on armed group consolidation in Afghanistan from 1989 to 2001. Using a linear probability model, we find that territorial control, organizational structure, and fungible forms of external support have the most significant impact on explaining consolidation. This article contributes to the study of armed group dynamics by drawing on existing theory and leveraging original data to explain variation in strategies of militant consolidation.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2021.2013752

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