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One or Many? Disentangling the Puzzle of Pro-Government Militia Deployment

Kamil C. Klosek and Emil A. Souleimanov

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 2025, vol. 48, issue 1, 67-91

Abstract: Why do some countries harbor pro-government militias (PGMs), while others do not? We assert that the deployment of PGMs depends on topographic, social, and political structures within which governments and rebels operate. Drawing on the concept of opportunity structures, we postulate that structural conditions within which governments are embedded in constitute a contributing factor to the existence and multiplicity of PGMs. Data from the Pro-Government Militia Dataset along with a two-stage hurdle model reveal that personalist regime type and civil wars increase the likelihood of PGM emergence. In contrast, ethnic fractionalization, onshore oil fields, drug production, number of rebel groups, and military prowess influence the number of PGMs.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2022.2111990

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