The role of earnings management and audit fees in non-financial companies during crises
Maria I. Kyriakou
Central Bank Review, 2025, vol. 25, issue 2
Abstract:
This study examines the mean difference and the indirect relationship between earnings management (measured by discretionary accruals) and audit fees. It spans the period from 2005 to 2020 for four countries in two pairs, namely Italy and Spain, and Germany and France. The investigation considers three of the most recent crises (the financial crisis, the sovereign debt crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic). The ANOVA method is used and its validity is compared with the Kruskal–Wallis non-parametric test along with interval plots. The latter plots are graphs that show the mean distance for the two estimated variables, which has been calculated using pooled standard deviation. The results indicate that earnings manipulation measured using discretionary accruals has increased more in Germany than in France and is similar in Italy and Spain. Audit fees have risen more in Germany than in France and have increased more in Italy than in Spain during the three most recent crises. Thus, these results indirectly confirm the positive association between earnings manipulation and audit fees.
Keywords: Audit fees; Earnings management; Financial crisis; Sovereign debt crisis; COVID-19 pandemic (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1303070125000113 (application/pdf)
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tcb:cebare:v:25:y:2025:i:2:article:100200
Access Statistics for this article
More articles in Central Bank Review from Research and Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by () and () and () and ().