The Manipulation and Truncation of Accounting Information and the Impact On the Decisional Process of the Stakeholders

Ovidiu Constantin Bunget (), Alin-Constantin Dumitrescu and Delia Carmen Deliu
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Alin-Constantin Dumitrescu: West University of TimiÅŸoara, Faculty Of Economics and Business Administration
Delia Carmen Deliu: West University of TimiÅŸoara, Faculty Of Economics and Business Administration

Anale. Seria Stiinte Economice. Timisoara, 2013, vol. XIX, 84-94

Abstract: Our paper aims to research the way the managers of a company may interfere in applying the accounting policies and methods so that they would gain advantages, besides the other different interests of the accounting information’s users. There are plenty situations when these stakeholders may be influenced in a direction or other by being presented a distorted accounting image, so that their behavior would be distorted too. Presenting an artificial view does nothing but emphasizes the informational asymmetry and influence the way financial markets function. We have exemplified the methods used to signal the informational asymmetry on the financial market from the perspective of the conflict of interests that exists between different users, as well as the methods of manipulation their behavior. We have tried to show that manipulating their behavior through providing the image intended by the managers does not necessarily mean bending the accounting standards and regulations, but it can easily be done within the boundaries of law, by using creative accounting. A special part was dedicated during our research to creative accounting – the analysis of this concept, giving examples of techniques, as well as expressing certain personal opinions in regards to the necessity to split this concept in two new concepts: innovatory accounting and creative fraudulent accounting. In regards of the truncation of the accounting information, we consider that the state is privileged, being closely followed by the management and – only in the third place – by the shareholders. Our perception is that, in Romania, we can observe a trend whereas the investors remain in a “Cinderella posture†, not being on the same level with the above-mentioned, their needs, maybe, not being seen with the same interest from the auditor’s point of view, him being in the position to express an independent opinion upon the truth and fairness of the financial statements. The main question being righteously born is related to the equidistance of the auditor and to the way he is responsible (and liable!) by the way he is aligning his audit engagement in order to satisfy the informational need of the stakeholders. We can consider, in this case, even a psychological dimension of an audit engagement.

Keywords: accounting information; informational asymmetry; manipulation; creative accounting; audit (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: M41 M42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tdt:annals:v:xix:y:2013:p:84-94

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