DISCIPLINER LES CENTRES FINANCIERS OFFSHORE: INCITATION PAR LA PRESSION INTERNATIONALE

Arnaud Bourgain and Patrice Pieretti

Region et Developpement, 2007, vol. 26, 65-84

Abstract: Since Offshore Financial Centers (OFCs) generally provide bank secrecy to foreign investors they are likely to attract criminal money. Recently however, academic writings have pointed to the fact that OFCs might have beneficial economic effects. In this context, we address the question whether pressure exerted by international organizations on offshore financial centers may be effective enough to enforce compliance with anti-money laundering regulations. Supposing that onshore and offshore banking centers compete with each other, we show that if costs of being lax (in particular, reputation costs) in customer identification are high enough, offshore banks have an incentive to comply credibly and that in spite of the existence of bank secrecy. Furthermore, the likelihood that an offshore bank credibly opts for monitoring foreign deposits increases with the degree of international financial integration and with the tax difference between onshore and offshore centers.

Keywords: CENTRES FINANCIERS OFFSHORE; BLANCHIMENT D’ARGENT; RÉGLEMENTATION FINANCIÈRE INTERNATIONALE (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F21 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tou:journl:v:26:y:2007:p:65-84

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