ReGULATION ET DeVELOPPEMENT: UNE ANALYSE THeORIQUE À PARTIR DE L’ENFORCEMENT ET LA SePARATION DES POUVOIRS

Daouda Diakité

Region et Developpement, 2008, vol. 28, 181-206

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to analyze regulation in LDCs taking into account their specificities compared to developed countries. By using a regulation model with an imperfect contract enforcement mechanism, we show how the separation of powers improves the enforcement quality and social welfare in an environment fraught with corruption.

Keywords: JEUX NON COOPeRATIFS; THeORIE DU MARCHANDAGE (BARGAINING); ASYMeTRIE D’INFORMATION ET INFORMATION PRIVeE; eCONOMIE DE LA ReGULATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D82 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tou:journl:v:28:y:2008:p:181-206

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