TICKET UNDERPRICING AND PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR MEGA-EVENTS

Christoph Eichhorn () and Marco Sahm ()
Additional contact information
Christoph Eichhorn: Department of Economics, University of Munich
Marco Sahm: Department of Business and Economics, TUM Munich

Region et Developpement, 2010, vol. 31, 37-46

Abstract: The organizer of a mega-event often owns a monopoly for several products like tickets and sponsorship contracts. While ticket prices below the maximum sellout price reduce gate revenues, they increase the degree to which the event is accepted by the population of the host region. Since public support usually serves as an important input factor for sponsors, it increases revenues in the market for sponsorship contracts. Hence, ticket underpricing may well maximize overall profits of the organizer. Moreover, if public support exerts some positive externality on the regional development, such underpricing may be beneficial for the host region, too.

Keywords: MULTI-PRODUCT MONOPOLY; TWO-SIDED MARKETS; DEMAND RATIONING (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 D45 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://regionetdeveloppement.univ-tln.fr/wp-content/uploads/6-Eichhorn_Sahm.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tou:journl:v:31:y:2010:p:37-46

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Region et Developpement from Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christophe Van Huffel ().