Collude, Compete, or Both? Deregulation in the Norwegian Airline Industry

Kjell G Salvanes, Frode Steen and Lars Sørgard

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2003, vol. 37, issue 3, 383-416

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to test the nature of competition concerning price and capacity setting in the Norwegian airline industry after its deregulation in 1994. Did the two airlines, SAS and Braathens, compete on prices and capacities (competition), collude on prices and capacities (collusion), or collude on prices and compete on capacities (semicollusion)? We reject the hypothesis that they achieved collusion, and we find the observed behaviour consistent with semicollusive behaviour and inconsistent with competitive behaviour. © The London School of Economics and the University of Bath 2003

Date: 2003
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Working Paper: Collude, Compete, or Both? Deregulation in the Norwegian Airline Industry (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:37:y:2003:i:3:p:383-416

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