Early Competition on Discount Tickets

Ryosuke Ishii and Kuninori Nakagawa

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 2015, vol. 49, issue 2, 219-235

Abstract: We consider the relationship between passenger behaviour and airline behaviour through flight scheduling and price competition. We focus on how an option for early ticket purchase affects the competition between two airlines. In our model, airlines set two ticket prices for passengers: one before the passengers know when they would take the flight; and the other after they know the most preferable time to take the flight. We find that in a subgame perfect equilibrium, airlines operate flights on an efficient schedule from the perspective of passengers. © 2015 LSE and the University of Bath

Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.catchword.com/cgi-bin/cgi?ini=bc&body=l ... 0150401)49:2L.219;1- (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpe:jtecpo:v:49:y:2015:i:2:p:219-235

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Transport Economics and Policy is currently edited by B T Bayliss, S A Morrison, A Smith and D Graham

More articles in Journal of Transport Economics and Policy from University of Bath
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christopher F. Baum ().