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When Arguments Prevail Over Power: The CITES Procedure for the Listing of Endangered Species

Thomas Gehring and Eva Ruffing
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Thomas Gehring: Thomas Gehring is Professor of International Relations at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Economics and Business Administration of the University of Bamberg/Germany. He has published many articles and books on international environmental governance, European integration and international institutions. His most recent book, with Sebastian Oberthür, is Institutional Interaction in Global Environmental Governance. Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies (2006).
Eva Ruffing: Eva Ruffing is a Ph.D. student at the University of Bamberg/Germany and a member of the post-graduate programme, "Markets and Social Systems in Europe." She works on regulatory governance in the fields of environment and financial markets.

Global Environmental Politics, 2008, vol. 8, issue 2, 123-148

Abstract: The legitimacy and effectiveness of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) depends on problem-adequate listing decisions. Decisions are frequently highly controversial, because they commit the member states to imposing trade restrictions on listed species. We examine whether-and how-CITES' impressive institutional apparatus deprives the member states of their bargaining power and empowers actors who can make reasoned arguments on the merits of a listing decision. For this purpose, we demonstrate theoretically that appropriately designed decision-making procedures can diminish stake-holders' opportunities for exploiting their bargaining power and provide room for reason-based deliberation. Subsequently, we explore member states' and other stakeholders' incentives, created by the CITES listing procedure, for refraining from bargaining and accepting scientifically sound decisions. Finally, we examine three recent controversial listing decisions as examples of the actual operation of the listing procedure. (c) 2008 by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Date: 2008
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