Relationships, Commitment, and Labor Productivity Growth

Patrick Francois () and Joanne Roberts ()

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2003, vol. 1, issue 2-3, 612-620

Abstract: This paper analyzes the interactions between growth and the contracting environment in production. With incompleteness in contracting, a firm's capacity to commit to its workers will depend on institutional frictions such as hiring and firing costs. This interaction of contracting structure and relationship costs will in part determine firms' technology choices. We suggest this as a possible explanation of the differential rates of labor productivity growth in Europe and the United States. (JEL: O31, O33, O38, O40, L16) Copyright (c) 2003 The European Economic Association.

Date: 2003
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