Markets For Partially Contractible Knowledge: Bootstrapping Versus Bundling

James Anton () and Dennis A. Yao
Additional contact information
Dennis A. Yao: Harvard University and University of Pennsylvania,

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005, vol. 3, issue 2-3, 745-754

Abstract: We discuss how a seller can appropriate rents when selling knowledge that lacks legal property rights by solving either an expropriation or a valuation problem and then analyze how seller rents increase when a portion of the intellectual property (IP) can be protected. The analysis shows that a sequential strategy in which the protected portion of the IP is sold prior to selling the unprotected IP is superior to selling both portions of the IP as a bundle. (JEL: D23, L14, O31) Copyright (c) 2005 The European Economic Association.

Date: 2005
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1542-4774/issues link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:3:y:2005:i:2-3:p:745-754

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of the European Economic Association is currently edited by Xavier Vives, George-Marios Angeletos, Orazio P. Attanasio, Fabio Canova and Roberto Perotti

More articles in Journal of the European Economic Association from MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The MIT Press ().