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Sorting with Motivated Agents: Implications for School Competition and Teacher Incentives

Timothy Besley () and Maitreesh Ghatak ()

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2006, vol. 4, issue 2-3, 404-414

Abstract: This paper proposes a simple framework to study incentives and matching in the market for teachers. The framework is used to investigate the consequences of introducing incentive pay for teachers when contracts have both a matching and an incentive effect. Our analysis suggests that school competition and teacher incentives cannot be studied in isolation from one another. (JEL: D73, I20, J45, L31 (c) 2006 by the European Economic Association.

Date: 2006
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Journal of the European Economic Association is currently edited by Xavier Vives, George-Marios Angeletos, Orazio P. Attanasio, Fabio Canova and Roberto Perotti

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Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:4:y:2006:i:2-3:p:404-414