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On The Robustness of Majority Rule

Partha Dasgupta and Eric Maskin

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2008, vol. 6, issue 5, 949-973

Abstract: We show that simple majority rule satisfies five standard and attractive axioms-the Pareto property, anonymity, neutrality, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and (generic) decisiveness-over a larger class of preference domains than (essentially) any other voting rule. Hence, in this sense, it is the most robust voting rule. This characterization of majority rule provides an alternative to that of May (1952). (JEL: D71) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.

JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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