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Arm's-Length Relationships without Moral Hazard

Jacques Crémer ()

Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010, vol. 8, issue 2-3, 377-387

Abstract: I show that cutting the flow of information between a principal and an agent can increase the power of the incentives of the agent to reveal private information. (JEL: D23, D82, D86, L20) (c) 2010 by the European Economic Association.

JEL-codes: D23 D82 D86 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Arm's length relationships without moral hazard (2009) Downloads
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Journal of the European Economic Association is currently edited by Xavier Vives, George-Marios Angeletos, Orazio P. Attanasio, Fabio Canova and Roberto Perotti

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