Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? Civilian Control Over the Military
Timothy Besley () and
James Robinson ()
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2010, vol. 8, issue 2-3, 655-663
The question of who guards the guards is intimately connected with broader questions of state capacity and the establishment of a monopoly of violence in society, something which is often viewed as the defining feature of the modern state. But to establish such a monopoly, civilian rulers need not only to build an effective military, but also to control it. In this paper we study how governments may solve this problem when they recognize that their decisions to build a strong army may have ramifications for subsequent coups. (JEL: H11, H56) (c) 2010 by the European Economic Association.
JEL-codes: H11 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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