Selecting Top Bureaucrats: Admission Exams and Performance in Brazil

Ricardo Dahis, Laura Schiavon and Thiago Scot
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Ricardo Dahis: Monash University
Laura Schiavon: Federal University of Juiz de Fora (UFJF)
Thiago Scot: World Bank

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2025, vol. 107, issue 2, 408-425

Abstract: In the absence of strong incentives, public service delivery is crucially dependent on bureaucrat selection. Despite wide adoption by governments, it is unclear whether civil service examinations reliably select for job performance. We investigate this question focusing on state judges in Brazil. Exploring monthly data on judicial output and cross-court movement, we estimate that judges account for at least 23% of the observed variation in the number of cases disposed. With novel data on admission examinations, we show that judges with higher grades perform better than lower-ranked peers. Our results suggest competitive examinations can be an effective way to screen candidates.

Date: 2025
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