Public Leaderboard Feedback in Sampling Competition: An Experimental Investigation

Stanton Hudja, Brian Roberson and Yaroslav Rosokha
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Stanton Hudja: University of Toronto
Brian Roberson: Purdue University
Yaroslav Rosokha: Purdue University

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2025, vol. 107, issue 2, 555-569

Abstract: We investigate the role of performance feedback, in the form of a public leaderboard, in a sequential-sampling contest with costly observations. We show theoretically that for contests with a fixed ending date (i.e., finite horizon), providing public performance feedback may result in fewer expected observations and a lower expected value of the winning observation. We conduct a controlled laboratory experiment to test the theoretical predictions and find that the experimental results largely support the theory. In addition, we investigate how individual characteristics affect competitive sequential-sampling activity.

Date: 2025
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