Who Deters Entry? Evidence on the Use of Strategic Entry Deterrents

David S Bunch and Robert Smiley

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1992, vol. 74, issue 3, 509-21

Abstract: To deter entry into new product markets, firms most often use the creation of product loyalty through advertising and the preemption of markets through numerous and broad patents. Filling all product niches, making the results for highly profitable division, and advertising are used most frequently for existing products. For newly developed products, strategic entry deterrents are used more often when markets are concentrated, populated by large firms, and research intensive. Strategic entry deterrents for existing products are used in concentrated, research intensive markets, but firm size has no effect. Firms develop strategies to deter entry less when other barriers exist. Copyright 1992 by MIT Press.

Date: 1992
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (39)

Downloads: (external link)
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6535%2819920 ... 0.CO%3B2-0&origin=bc full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:restat:v:74:y:1992:i:3:p:509-21

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://mitpressjour ... rnal/?issn=0034-6535

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Pierre Azoulay, Olivier Coibion, Will Dobbie, Raymond Fisman, Benjamin R. Handel, Brian A. Jacob, Kareen Rozen, Xiaoxia Shi, Tavneet Suri and Yi Xu

More articles in The Review of Economics and Statistics from MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The MIT Press ().