Controlling the Conflict of Interest in Management Buyouts

John Easterwood

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1994, vol. 76, issue 3, 512-22

Abstract: A controversial aspect of the management buyouts that were popular throughout the 1980s is the potential for a conflict of interest to arise when a manager bids to acquire the firm he manages. This study examines 184 management buyouts and reports three findings. First, returns to prebuyout shareholders are greater when managers must bid against outside acquirers. Second, bid revisions in the face of competition exceed revisions due to shareholder litigation and negotiations with boards. Third, the incidence of competition is negatively related to the prebuyout share holdings of managers. Coauthors are Ronald F. Singer, Anju Seth, and Darla F. Lang. Copyright 1994 by MIT Press.

Date: 1994
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