Information And Cost Asymmetry In Experimental Duopoly Markets

Charles Mason and Owen R. Phillips

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1997, vol. 79, issue 2, 290-299

Abstract: We analyze data from experimental duopoly markets to assess the role information plays in facilitating collusion. In these markets, profitability can be common knowledge or private information. Market outputs are estimated in structures with symmetric and asymmetric costs under the two information conditions. Symmetric markets are more cooperative when profitability is common knowledge; asymmetric market outputs are unaffected by information differences. However, common knowledge in asymmetric markets increases the share of the output produced by the low-cost producer, and therefore increases industry efficiency. © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (45)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/003465397556647 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:restat:v:79:y:1997:i:2:p:290-299

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://mitpressjour ... rnal/?issn=0034-6535

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Pierre Azoulay, Olivier Coibion, Will Dobbie, Raymond Fisman, Benjamin R. Handel, Brian A. Jacob, Kareen Rozen, Xiaoxia Shi, Tavneet Suri and Yi Xu

More articles in The Review of Economics and Statistics from MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The MIT Press ().