Roses or Lemons: Adverse Selection in the Market for Thoroughbred Yearlings

Brian Chezum and Brad Wimmer

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2000, vol. 79, issue 3, 521-526

Abstract: This paper tests for the presence of adverse selection in thoroughbred yearling auction markets. Thoroughbred auctions consist of two seller types: sellers who breed horses to race and sell (racers) and sellers who take all their yearlings to auction (breeders). If racers use private information, keeping those yearlings with a higher probability of on-track success, they are likely to receive a lower price for similar yearlings as compared to breeders. Using data from Keeneland's 1994 September yearling sale, we find support for this hypothesis. We improve on previous studies by analyzing the distinction between seller types on a continuous scale. © 1997 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Date: 2000
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