Why Cooperate? Public Goods, Economic Power, and the Montreal Protocol

Kurt J. Beron, James Murdoch () and Wim Vijverberg
Additional contact information
Kurt J. Beron: University of Texas at Dallas

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2003, vol. 85, issue 2, 286-297

Abstract: This paper develops a correlated probit model to describe dichotomous choices that may contain a public-goods component or some other forms of interdependency. The key contribution of the paper is to formulate tests for interdependent behavior among agents. In particular, we examine the decisions by nations whether or not to ratify the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer. Specifically, we reject free riding as a motive for not ratifying the Protocol, and we find little evidence that individual nations were influenced by the behavior of their largest trading partners. Hence, the data suggest that, with respect to the Montreal Protocol, most nations acted without regard for the actions of other nations. © 2003 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Date: 2003
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (75)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/003465303765299819 link to full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:restat:v:85:y:2003:i:2:p:286-297

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://mitpressjour ... rnal/?issn=0034-6535

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Pierre Azoulay, Olivier Coibion, Will Dobbie, Raymond Fisman, Benjamin R. Handel, Brian A. Jacob, Kareen Rozen, Xiaoxia Shi, Tavneet Suri and Yi Xu

More articles in The Review of Economics and Statistics from MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The MIT Press ().