Foreign Lobbies and U.S. Trade Policy

Kishore Gawande, Pravin Krishna and Michael J. Robbins
Additional contact information
Michael J. Robbins: Bingham McCutchen LLP

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2006, vol. 88, issue 3, 563-571

Abstract: In popular discussion, much has been made of the susceptibility of government policies to lobbying by foreigners-the general presumption being that this is harmful to the home economy. However, in a trade policy context this may not be the case. If the policy outcome absent any foreign lobbying is characterized by welfare-reducing trade barriers, foreign lobbying may reduce such barriers and possibly raise welfare. Using a new data set on foreign political activity in the United States, this paper investigates this question empirically. Tariffs and nontariff barriers are both found to be negatively related with foreign lobbying activity. Copyright by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Date: 2006
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (70)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/rest.88.3.563 link to full text (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: Foreign Lobbies and US Trade Policy (2004)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:restat:v:88:y:2006:i:3:p:563-571

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://mitpressjour ... rnal/?issn=0034-6535

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Pierre Azoulay, Olivier Coibion, Will Dobbie, Raymond Fisman, Benjamin R. Handel, Brian A. Jacob, Kareen Rozen, Xiaoxia Shi, Tavneet Suri and Yi Xu

More articles in The Review of Economics and Statistics from MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The MIT Press ().