Friend or Foe? Cooperation and Learning in High-Stakes Games

Felix Oberholzer-Gee, Joel Waldfogel and Matthew W. White
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Felix Oberholzer-Gee: Harvard University
Matthew W. White: University of Pennsylvania

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2010, vol. 92, issue 1, 179-187

Abstract: Why do people frequently cooperate in defiance of their immediate incentives? One explanation is that individuals are conditionally cooperative. As an explanation of behavior in one-shot settings, such preferences require individuals to be able to discern their opponents' preferences. Using data from a television game show, we provide evidence about how individuals implement conditionally cooperative preferences. We show that contestants forgo large sums of money to be cooperative; they cooperate at heightened levels when their opponents are predictably cooperative; and they fare worse when their observable characteristics predict less cooperation because opponents avoid cooperating with them. © 2010 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Date: 2010
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