Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds
David Albouy ()
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2013, vol. 95, issue 1, 127-141
In a two-party legislature, districts represented by the majority may receive greater funds if majority-party legislators have greater proposal power or disproportionately form coalitions with each other. Funding types received by districts may depend on their legislators' party identity when party preferences differ. Estimates from the United States, using fixed-effect and regression-discontinuity designs, indicate that states represented by members of Congress in the majority receive greater federal grants, especially in transportation, and defense spending. States represented by Republicans receive more for defense and transportation than those represented by Democrats; the latter receive more spending for education and urban development. © 2013 The President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Keywords: distributional politics; legislative bargaining; federal spending; political parties; Congressional politics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H77 H5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Partisan Representation in Congress and the Geographic Distribution of Federal Funds (2009)
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