Authorized Generic Entry prior to Patent Expiry: Reassessing Incentives for Independent Generic Entry
Silvia Appelt
Additional contact information
Silvia Appelt: University of Munich
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2015, vol. 97, issue 3, 654-666
Abstract:
Originators seek to mitigate the loss of monopoly power by authorizing generic entry prior to patent expiry. Off-patent competition may be adversely affected if authorized generic entry substantially lowers the attractiveness of subsequent generic entry. This study assesses the impact of authorized generic entry on independent generic entry in recent cases of patent expiry in Germany. The results of a recursive bivariate probit regression, accounting for the endogeneity of authorized generic entry, show that authorized generic entry has no significant effect on the likelihood of generic entry. Business scope expansion and rent-seeking motives drive authorized generic entry decisions.
Keywords: patents; monopoly; generic entry; germany; recursive bivariate (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C35 I11 L12 L41 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (16)
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/REST_a_00488 (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tpr:restat:v:97:y:2015:i:2:p:654-666
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://mitpressjour ... rnal/?issn=0034-6535
Access Statistics for this article
The Review of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Pierre Azoulay, Olivier Coibion, Will Dobbie, Raymond Fisman, Benjamin R. Handel, Brian A. Jacob, Kareen Rozen, Xiaoxia Shi, Tavneet Suri and Yi Xu
More articles in The Review of Economics and Statistics from MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by The MIT Press ().