Economics at your fingertips  

The Political Consequences of Income Shocks: Explaining the Consolidation of Democracy in France

Raphael Franck ()

The Review of Economics and Statistics, 2016, vol. 98, issue 1, 57-82

Abstract: This study analyzes the circumstances that enabled France to become in the late nineteenth century the first stable parliamentary democracy with universal (male) suffrage in Europe. It establishes a causal relationship between short-term variations in local income and the electoral support for the coalition of republican parties that represented the newly established regime. The results suggest the republican coalition won the parliamentary elections because most French regions did not suffer from transitory negative income shocks stemming from heavy precipitations. They thus raise questions about the rationality of voters and, ultimately, the actual causes of the consolidation of democracy in France.

Keywords: Democracy; Economic Growth; Voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 N13 O11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10) Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link) (application/pdf)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link:

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://mitpressjour ... rnal/?issn=0034-6535

Access Statistics for this article

The Review of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Pierre Azoulay, Olivier Coibion, Will Dobbie, Raymond Fisman, Benjamin R. Handel, Brian A. Jacob, Kareen Rozen, Xiaoxia Shi, Tavneet Suri and Yi Xu

More articles in The Review of Economics and Statistics from MIT Press
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Ann Olson ().

Page updated 2022-05-27
Handle: RePEc:tpr:restat:v:98:y:2016:i:1:p:57-82