Monopsony and Teachers' Salaries in Georgia

Simon Medcalfe and Robert Thornton

Journal of Labor Research, 2006, vol. 27, issue 4, 537-554

Abstract: Does monopsony power in the labor market for teachers affect teachers' salaries? Prior studies have found mixed evidence of monopsony effects in teacher labor markets. A major problem has been controlling for union wage effects, which potentially mask the wage-depressing effects of monopsony. We use data from the state of Georgia, one of the few states in the United States where no teacher bargaining takes place. We detect no evidence of lower average teacher salaries in less competitive labor markets. We also find limited evidence that salaries of beginning teachers may be about two percent lower in less competitive labor markets, but our findings are not robust with respect to our various measures of monopsony and labor market boundaries. We conclude that even in the absence of unions the effect of monopsony on teachers' salaries appears to be very small.

Date: 2006
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