The Choice Architecture of Choice Architecture: Toward a Non-Paternalistic Nudge Policy
David Colander and
Andrew Qi Lin Chong
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Andrew Qi Lin Chong: Middlebury College
Journal of Economic Analysis, 2010, vol. 1, issue 1, 42-48
Abstract:
The paper seeks to recast the goal of nudge policy from a goal of achieving a specific result determined by government or by behavioral economists to a goal of giving individuals as much power as is practical to decide the choice architecture they face. We call a nudge with such a giving individuals “power over choice mechanisms” goal a non-paternalistic nudge policy. The goal of nonpaternalistic nudge policy is not to achieve a better result as seen by government or by behavioral economists. The goal of non-paternalistic nudge policy is to achieve a better result as seen by the agents being nudged as revealed through their choices of choice architectures. We argue that non-paternalistic nudge policy fits much better with the values inherent in Classical liberalism than does libertarian paternalistic nudge policy.
Date: 2010
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Choice Architecture of Choice Architecture: Toward a Non-paternalistic Nudge Policy (2010) 
Working Paper: The Choice Architecture of Choice Architecture: Toward a Nonpaternalistic Nudge Policy (2009) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tua:journl:v:1:y:2010:i:1:p:42-48
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