Are Employer Mandates to Offer Health Insurance Effective in Reducing Subsidized Coverage Crowd-Out of Employer-Sponsored Insurance?
Sean Lyons ()
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Sean Lyons: Congressional Budget Office
American Journal of Health Economics, 2017, vol. 3, issue 3, 370-391
In 2015, the Affordable Care Act began requiring large employers to offer affordable health insurance coverage to their full-time employees or pay a penalty. Will this mandate significantly affect the take-up of employer health insurance? This paper analyzes the Massachusetts Health Care and Insurance Reform Law of 2006 to gain some insight on the impact of employer mandates on coverage distributions. Results suggest that the large-firm employer mandate to offer health insurance was effective at reducing subsidized insurance crowd-out of employer-sponsored health insurance among workers who were income-eligible for subsidies. Using a triple-differences identification strategy and a synthetic control group approach, this paper finds that roughly half of those newly taking up employer-sponsored insurance in large firms subjected to the mandate would have enrolled in subsidized coverage had their employer been exempted from or subjected to a more lenient employer mandate.
Keywords: health; health care; health reform; insurance; Massachusetts; labor market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I13 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:amjhec:v:3:y:2017:i:3:p:370-391
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