Mutual Fund Exit and Mutual Fund Fees

Philip C. English, Ilhan Demiralp and William P. Dukes

Journal of Law and Economics, 2011, vol. 54, issue 3, 723 - 749

Abstract: We examine the effect of mutual fund fee structure on mutual fund exit mode and timing. The evidence presented herein is consistent with fee maximization by mutual fund sponsors or managers, increased conflicts of interest for funds charging 12b-1 fees and higher management fees, and a pecking order for mutual fund exit method. Specifically, mutual fund exits that result in decreased fee income are delayed relative to exits that do not and exit strategies that retain fee income are more likely than strategies that do not.

Date: 2011
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ucp:jlawec:doi:10.1086/658492

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