Does Higher Malpractice Pressure Deter Medical Errors?

Toshiaki Iizuka

Journal of Law and Economics, 2013, vol. 56, issue 1, 161 - 188

Abstract: An important objective of medical liability law is to deter medical errors by punishing negligent mistakes. However, relatively little evidence exists on the deterrence effect. Using newly constructed measures of preventable medical complications and state tort reforms in the United States between 1994 and 2007, I find evidence that higher liability pressure deters preventable medical complications associated with four specific obstetric and gynecologic procedures. The results also show that the effects of tort reforms vary according to the specific reform in question. While joint and several liability reform (which increases doctor accountability) appears to decrease preventable medical complications, collateral source rule reform and caps on punitive damages appear to increase these complications. Opponents of tort reform often argue that tort reforms may adversely affect patient safety, and the results of this paper suggest that such a concern is legitimate.

Date: 2013
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